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COMMERCIAL LAW SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
During the 1993 survey period, notable Tenth Circuit commercial law
decisions addressed banking and corporate law issues. Part I of this Survey
examines recent banking law decisions. In 1993, the Tenth Circuit vari-
ously restricted and expanded federal banking regulators' powers under
the D'Oench doctrine' and § 1823(e) 2 of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA").s In Oklahoma Radio Associates
v. FDIC,4 the court restricted federal superpowers by endorsing a complete
innocence exception to the D'Oench estoppel doctrine and by refusing to
give retroactive effect to FIRREA's extensions of § 1823(e). In contrast,
Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC5 enlarged federal superpowers by applying D'Oench
and § 1823(e) to bar debtor defenses to liability based on affirmative tort
claims as well as those based on unwritten agreements or verbal
misrepresentations.
Part II of this Survey discusses a recent corporate law decision. NLRB
v. Greater Kansas City Roofing6 summarizes the Tenth Circuit's stance con-
cerning piercing the corporate veil with the federal common law alter ego
doctrine. While the decision adds little to the substantive law, it merits
attention for its clairification and explanation of the alter ego doctrine.
I. BANKING LAW
In response to the savings and loan crisis of the eighties, Congress
passed FIRREA. 7 FIRREA extensively revised federal regulation of the
savings and loan industry to insure its integrity, safety and stability.8
Among its specific purposes, FIRREA sought to improve federal supervi-
sion of financial institutions and to strengthen federal regulators' enforce-
ment powers.9 Towards these ends, Congress expanded the application of
1. The D'Oench doctrine was articulated in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S.
447 (1941), reh'g denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1942). See infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text
for an explanation of the D'Oench doctrine.
2. 12 U.S.C. § 182 3(e) (Supp. IV 1992) partially codifies the common law D'Oench doc-
trine. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text for an explanation of § 1823(e).
3. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
4. 987 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1993).
5. 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
6. 2 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1993).
7. H.R. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. I at 291-94 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 87-90 (discussing the history of the savings and loan industry and the gene-
sis of the crisis). See aso James F. Hogg, Section 1823(e) and the D'Oend, Duhme Doctrine, 16
HAMLINE L.Rv. 55, 55-56 (1992).
8. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, § 101, 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. (103 Stat.) 187.
9. Id. § 101(2), (9).
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FIRREA's special enforcement provisions contained in section 1823(e). 10
FIRREA's special enforcement provisions prohibit debtors from asserting
nearly every defense in a lawsuit by federal regulators to collect an institu-
tion's outstanding loan obligations.
11
These statutory provisions, combined with the common law enforce-
ment powers available to the FDIC and the RTC, give federal banking
regulators a substantial advantage in debt collection litigation. 12 Some
commentators, troubled by the magnitude of these prerogatives, and the
manifest injustice they frequently work, have called upon courts to restrain
their scope. 13 Recent decisions leave it uncertain whether the Tenth Cir-
cuit is prepared to answer this call.
A. Scope of the D'Oench Estoppel Doctrine and FIRREA § 1823(e): Oklahoma
Radio Associates v. FOIL 14 and Castleglen Inc. v. RTC
15
When the FDIC or the RTC takes over a failed financial institution's
assets and sues to collect debts still owed to the institution, a growing body
of statutory and common law strips debtors of most otherwise valid de-
fenses or counterclaims against liability. These "superpowers" are
designed to enhance federal regulators' ability to deal effectively with the
failure of a financial insitution. 16 During the 1993 Survey period, the
Tenth Circuit addressed two of the FDIC's and RTC's most commonly em-
ployed superpowers: the D'Oench estoppel doctrine and FIRREA
§ 1823(e).
17
The Supreme Court articulated the D'Oench doctrine in D'Oench,
Duhme & Co. v. FDIC.18 In that case, the FDIC sued to collect on a promis-
sory note obtained from a bank as collateral for a loan.' 9 The maker of
the note denied liability based on a written agreement by the bank promis-
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (Supp. IV 1992). FIRREA specifically extended § 1823(e) to
cover the FDIC and the RTC in their capacity as either conservator or receiver. Prior to
FIRREA, § 1823(e) only applied to the FDIC in its receivership capacity. GREGORY PULLES ET
AL., FIRREA: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE FINANCIAL IN-
STITUTIONS RECOVERY, REFORM AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 255 (1993).
11. See infra part II.A.
12. See Fred Galves, FDIC and RTC Special Powers in Failed Bank Litigation, 22 COLO. LAW.
473 (1993).
13. See generally Richard E. Flint, Why D'Oench, Duhme? An Economic, Legal and Philosophi-
cal Critique of a Failed Bank Policy, 26 VAL. U. L. REv 465 (1992) (arguing for the repeal of
§ 1823(e) and the overruling of D'Oench and its progeny); Hogg, supra note 5, at56 ("[wlith
Congress' enthusiasm for reform, it is not surprising that the reform pendulum... may have
swung too far in favor of the federal banking agencies.").
14. 987 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1993).
15. 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
16. The best known of the FDIC's and RTC's superpowers are the D'Oench doctrine, 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e), and the federal Holder in Due Course Doctrine. Galves, supra note 12, at
473.
17. Between 1989 and 1992, 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) was cited in over three hundred cases.
See Hogg, supra note 7, at 56 (describing the level of citation as "extraordinary. . . compared
to other FIRREA sections"). Likewise, D'Oench and its extensions are "uniformly accepted in
failed bank litigation." See Calves, supra note 12, at 474.
18. 315 U.S. 447 (1941), reh'g denied, 315 U.S. 830 (1942).
19. Id. at 454.
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ing that the note would not be enforced.20 The FDIC lacked knowledge
of the agreement until after demand for payment.2 1 The Supreme Court
deemed the maker to have participated in a scheme to misrepresent the
bank's assets to the FDIC by executing a facially unqualified note.2 2 Not-
ing that federal legislation reflected a strong policy in favor of protecting
the FDIC and the public funds it administers from such misrepresenta-
tions, the court estopped the maker from asserting the agreement as a
defense to liability.
23
Justice Douglas' majority opinion specifically provided that the FDIC
is not required to prove either intent to deceive or specific injury.24 It
would suffice that the maker had "lent himself to a scheme or arrange-
ment whereby the banking authority . . .was likely to be misled."
25
Schemes subject to estoppel under D'Oench have expanded well beyond
oral agreements to encompass defenses such as failure of consideration,
26
fraud in the inducement,27 and unconscionability,28 among others.
2 9
Section 1823(e) of FIRREA partially codifies the D'Oench doctrine.
3 0
The section also adds specific requirements prohibiting assertion of agree-
ments tending to diminish or defeat the interest of the FDIC in any asset it
acquires unless the agreement is: (1) in writing, (2) executed by the bank
and the obligor, (3) established as approved in the board or loan commit-
tee minutes and (4) continuously part of official records.3 1 Section
1823(e) essentially bars the same defenses as D'Oench.3
2
Courts have recognized a narrow set of potential exceptions to both
D'Oench and section 1823(e). These exceptions include fraud in the fac-
tum,33 forgery or material alteration,34 and defenses based on breach of
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 459-61.
23. Id. at 457, 461.
24. Id. at 461.
25. Id. at 460. See also Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86 (1987). Although decided under
§ 1823(e), Langley held that neither fraud in the inducement nor the FDIC's knowledge of
the agreement bars section 1823(e)'s applicability. Id. at 94-95.
26. Taylor Trust v. Security Trust Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 844 F.2d 337, 342 (6th Cir.
1988).
27. Mainland Say. Ass'n v. Riverfront Ass'n, 872 F.2d 955, 956 (10th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 890 (1989).
28. Clay v. FDIC, 934 F.2d 69, 72-73 (5th Cir. 1991).
29. D'Oench bars most tort claims used either affirmatively or defensively. For a compre-
hensive listing, see PULLES ET AL., supra note 1012, at 256.1-256.4(2).
30. Authorities conflict on whether § 1823(e) represents a parallel authority to the
D'Oench doctrine, a codification of the doctrine, or a partial codification of the doctrine.
PULLES ET AL., supra note 10, at 256.
31. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(1988 & Supp. IV 1993).
32. See, e.g., Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 94 (1987) (using section 1823(e) to bar de-
fense of fraudulent inducement). It is uncertain whether or not section 1823(e), like
D'Oench, bars defenses based on failure of consideration. The Sixth Circuit, at least, finds
that it does not. FDIC v. Leach, 772 F.2d 1262, 1266 (6th Cir. 1985) (failure of consideration
is not barred by § 1823(e), since the statutory bar applies only to unwritten agreements, and
the defense was based on the lack of any enforceable agreement).
33. See Langey, 484 U.S. at 92-93 (recognizing possible exception for fraud in the factum
as there would be no agreement to enforce in the first place).
34. See FDIC v. Turner, 869 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1989) (discussing a material alteration).
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bilateral obligations where the payee's obligation clearly appears in the
bank's loan files.3 5 A few courts recognize the "wholly innocent maker"
defense as an additional exception to D'Oench estoppel.3 6 Courts gener-
ally cite FDIC v. Meo37 as establishing this defense. In Meo, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that D'Oench did not estop a debtor from asserting a defense
where he was "neither a party to any deceptive scheme involving, nor neg-
ligent with respect to, circumstances giving rise to the claimed defense."
3 8
The exception is not uniformly recognized; some courts have character-
ized it as an outdated understanding of the D'Oench doctrine.
39
D'Oench and § 1823(e) contribute towards FIRREA's overriding goal
of maintaining confidence and stability in the banking system by ensuring
the accuracy of the records of federally insured financial institutions
under the FDIC's regulation.40 The FDIC must be able to determine
quickly which institutions are failing and how best to protect depositors
once the institution has failed.4 1 To this end, the FDIC must have accu-
rate information regarding the financial condition of the institution.
42
"Neither the FDIC nor state banking authorities would be able to make
reliable evaluations if bank records contained seemingly unqualified notes
that are in fact subject to undisclosed conditions."
43
The D'Oench doctrine and its statutory codification have expanded
considerably in their application. Commentators have criticized the broad
scope of both D'Oench and section 1823(e) as allowing the FDIC to impose
draconian measures against unwary debtors who naively trust oral agree-
ments made with lending institutions.
44
1. Tenth Circuit Decision: Oklahoma Radio Associates v. FOIL
4 5
The Comptroller of Currency closed Citizens Bank ("Citizens") and
appointed the FDIC as receiver in August of 1986.46 When the FDIC
chose to liquidate the bank, it demanded payment of a $175,000 loan Citi-
35. Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743, 746-47 (7th Cir. 1981).
36. See, e.g., Oklahoma Radio Assoc. v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 685, 693-94 (10th Cir. 1993); Agri-
Export Coop. v. Universal Say. Ass'n, 767 F. Supp. 824, 832 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
37. 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1974).
38. Meo, 505 F.2d at 793. The defendant had executed a promissory note to a bank in
exchange for 1000 shares of the bank's stock. The bank issued 1000 voting trust certificates
rather than stock. Id. at 791. The court found the defendant not negligent in failing to
discover the misexecution of his order and wholly unaware of the failure of consideration
until the FDIC, as receiver for the bank, filed suit to collect the note. Id. at 792.
39. FDIC v. Payne, 973 F.2d 403, 407 (5th Cir. 1992); Capital Bank & Trust v. 604 Co-
lumbus Ave. Realty Trust (In re Columbus Ave. Realty Trust), 968 F.2d 1332, 1347-48 (lst Cir.
1992); FSLIC v. Gordy, 928 F.2d 1558, 1567 n.14 (11th Cir. 1991).
40. Additionally, bars from statutory and common law safeguard federal insurance funds
from depletion by preventing debtors from pleading participation in a deceptive scheme as a
defense to their obligation to a failed financial institution. Hogg, supra note 7, at 57-60.
41. Id at 59.
42. "One purpose of § 1823(e) is to allow federal... bank examiners to rely on a bank's
records in evaluating the worth of the bank's assets." Langley v. FDIC, 484 U.S. 86, 91
(1987).
43. Id at 91-92.
44. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
45. 987 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1993).
46. Id. at 688.
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zens had made to Oklahoma Radio Associates ("ORA") which had come
due.47 ORA brought suit against the FDIC claiming that the FDIC's de-
mand for repayment in full breached Citizens' agreement to renew that
note over five years with a series of one-year notes.48 As evidence of the
agreement, ORA introduced a letter from Citizens' vice president confirm-
ing the terms of the agreement. 49 These terms mirrored those stated in
ORA's loan application. 50 ORA countered the assertion that the renewal
agreement constituted a secret side agreement by introducing an affidavit
from Citizens' vice president indicating that he had ordered both the con-
firmation letter and the loan application to be placed in the bank's files.
5 1
The FDIC counterclaimed for payment of the loan.52 The FDIC ar-
gued that, under the D'Oench doctrine, ORA could not assert its secret side
agreement with Citizens and avoid its obligation under a facially unquali-
fied note.53 As to ORA's contention that the confirmation letter was in
Citizens' files at the time of failure, the FDIC presented evidence that its
examiner had located ORA's loan application, but no qualifying letter, in
the bank's loan files.
54
The district court found the D'Oench doctrine applicable to ORA's
defense. 55 The court emphasized that the promissory note, on which the
FDIC relied, clearly indicated the instrument's maturity date. 56 The con-
firmation letter represented "[a]t best a secret agreement that Citizens
would not enforce the note on its express maturity date."5 7 The court
held that D'Oench applied directly to these facts because such an agree-
ment would tend to indicate deceptively to bank examiners that Citizens
had committed its assets for one year while it had, in reality, committed
them for five years.
58
On appeal, ORA challenged the district court's ruling on two
grounds. First, ORA asserted that the FDIC failed to establish that the
renewal agreement was deceptive or would tend to deceive. 59 Second,
ORA argued that the FDIC failed to establish in the record that ORA's
conduct was even slightly culpable.
60
47. Id.
48. Id. at 688-89.
49. Id. at 689. The letter confirmed that upon the original note's 90 day maturity "the
note [would] be renewed on a 60 month basis with a series of one year notes." Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 688.
52. Id. at 689. There were actually two promissory notes relating to the loan in question.
The first note carried a maturity date of October 15, 1985. Citizens later renewed ORA's
note with a new one carrying a stated maturity date of no later than August 15, 1986. Id. at







59. Id. at 692.
60. Id. at 693.
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The Tenth Circuit agreed with ORA's first argument because the
presence or absence of the confirmation letter in Citizens' files remained
a disputed issue. 61 Establishing the letter's existence in Citizens' files
would prevent the FDIC from asserting D'Oench, since the manifestation of
both parties' obligations in the records would protect banking authorities
from deception.
6 2
The court also endorsed ORA's second challenge. While agreeing
that the D'Oench doctrine did not require an intent to deceive, the Tenth
Circuit observed that it did not bar all defenses to attempts to collect on
promissory notes.63 The court endorsed Meo's "wholly innocent maker"
rationale and found summary judgement based on D'Oench erroneous
where the record failed to indicate any culpability on the part of the
obligor.
64
The Tenth Circuit dealt with one final issue in Oklahoma Radio Associ-
ates: whether to afford retroactive effect to FIRREA's extension of 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e). Throughout the district court proceedings, § 1823(e)
covered the FDIC in its corporate capacity but not in its capacity as re-
ceiver.65 While the case awaited appeal, FIRREA extended section
1823(e)'s protection to the FDIC as receiver.6 6 FDIC argued that the
court should give retroactive effect to FIRREA's extension of § 1823(e)
and bar ORA's assertion of the alleged renewal agreement. 67 According
to the FDIC, the renewal agreement's failure to comply with § 1823(e)'s
strict requirements, prevented ORA from using the agreement as a de-
fense to the FDIC's counterclaim. 68 Noting that its recent opinions re-
fused to give retroactive effect to statutes and Supreme Court principles




Oklahoma Radio Associates is noteworthy for its adoption of the com-
plete innocence exception to the D'Oench doctrine. As noted earlier,
courts do not uniformly endorse this exception. 70 Recognition that
D'Oench requires some showing of culpable conduct on the obligor's part
narrows the doctrine's scope. Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit provided
little guidance for applying its precedent. The court furnished no indica-
61. Id. Both sides introduced conflicting evidence on this point. See supra notes 48, 49,
and 51, and accompanying text.
62. Oklahoma Radio Assocs., 987 F.2d at 692-93. The decision itself merely held that if
ORA can establish that the renewal agreement was manifest in Citizens' records, D'Oench will
not apply. Id. at 693. The court explained the basis for its holding while exploring defenses
not barred by D'Oench. Id. at 691-92 (citing Howell v. Continental Credit Corp., 655 F.2d 743,
746 (7th Cir. 1981)).
63. Oklahoma Radio Assocs., 987 F.2d at 693.
64. Id. at 694.




69. Id. at 695-96.
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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don of what type or degree of culpability would foreclose the complete
innocence exception and invoke the D'Oench bar.
3. Tenth Circuit Decision: Castleglen, Inc. v. RTC7'
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the scope of the D'Oench Doctrine
and § 1823(e) of FIRREA in Castleglen. In that case, the court extended
both doctrines' reach beyond contract defenses to preclude those based
on affirmative tort claims.
72
Castleglen, Inc. ("Castleglen") brought action against Commonwealth
Savings ("Commonwealth") based on numerous affirmative state law tort
claims.7 3 These claims arose from Commonwealth's alleged misrepresen-
tations regarding the profitability of an apartment project purchased by
Castleglen. During the pendency of that action, Commonwealth was de-
clared insolvent and the RTC, as conservator, was substituted as defend-
ant.7 4 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the RTC,
holding that both FIRREA § 1823(e) and D'Oench estoppel barred
Castleglen's claims.
75
On appeal, Castleglen challenged the district court's finding that
both D'Oench and § 1823(e) barred affirmative tort claims. 76 Castleglen
relied on the Tenth Circuit's holding in Grubb v. FDIC77 in arguing that
D'Oench prohibits contract claims based on misleading agreements, not af-
firmative claims of fraud.
78
Because defenses sounding in tort have the same practical effect as
those sounding in contract, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district
71. 984 F.2d 1571 (10th Cir. 1993).
72. Id. at 1577. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Castleglen also dealt with several other
issues. Among the most important, to the scope of § 1823(e) and D'Oench, the court struck
down Castleglen's attempt to take the case beyond the reach of the common law and the
statutory doctrines by characterizing the transaction as a "credit enhancement transaction"
rather than a loan. Id. at 1581. Regardless of appellation, D'Oench and § 1823(e) bar any
oral agreement which contradicts what the bank has told banking authorities, or which forms
any part of an effort to mislead banking authorities as to the bank's financial condition. Id.
73. Castleglen v. Commonwealth Say. Ass'n, 728 F.Supp. 656 (D. Utah 1989).
Castleglenn's state law tort claims included: fraud, misrepresentation, negligent misrepresen-
tation, negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. Id. at 659-60.
74. The events unfolded as follows. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board ("FHLBB")
declared Commonwealth insolvent and appointed the FSLIC as conservator. Id at 660.
FHLBB then replaced the FSLIC as conservator with the FSLIC as receiver. Id. FSLIC
chartered a new institution, Commonwealth Federal Savings ("Commonwealth Federal"),
which it placed under its conservatorship. The FSLIC then caused Commonwealth Federal
to purchase Commonwealth's assets. Id. The passage of FIRREA abolished the FSLIC and
replaced it with the RTC. Id. at 660-61. Thus, the RTC as conservator for Commonwealth
Federal was substituted as a defendant in this action for the insolvent Commonwealth. Id. at
661.
75. Id. at 678.
76. Castleglen, 984 F.2d at 1575.
77. 868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989).
78. Castleglen, 984 F.2d at 1577. While Grubb did involve an affirmative fraud claim, the
court in Castlegten denied that Grubb subjects the RTC (or FDIC) to such claims. Id, at 1578.
Rather, the misrepresentation claim in Grubb resulted in a judgment invalidating notes held
by the bank before the FDIC took over. Id. Hence, the invalidated notes failed to constitute
FDIC assets in the first place. Id.
1994]
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court that the D'Oench doctrine barred tort claims as well as contract de-
fenses. 79 "If the D'Oench doctrine is to have any force, courts cannot per-
mit debtors to evade its prohibitions simply by recasting their contract
defenses as affirmative tort claims."8 0
Moreover, the court noted that while fraud in the factum provides a
defense not subject to either D'Oench or § 1823(e), fraud in the induce-
ment does not.8 1 Casdeglen's claim that Commonwealth's misrepresenta-
tion of the venture's profitability induced Castleglen to enter the
agreement sounded in fraud in the inducement, as the misrepresentation
did not prevent Castleglen from understanding the nature of the agree-
ment.8 2 The court concluded that in either a contract defense or an af-
firmative tort claim, D'Oench bars the obligator from asserting fraud in the
inducement.
8 3
Castleglen next argued that the district court drew improper infer-
ences against it in granting summary judgment.8 4 Castleglen pointed to
several documents in Commonwealth's official records which supported
an inference that a written agreement existed which guaranteed the ven-
ture's profitability.85 With such an agreement allegedly manifested in
Commonwealth's records, both parties' obligations would be apparent
and banking authorities would not be deceived.8 6 Absent deception,
Castleglen concluded that it should prevail irrespective of whether D'Oench
and § 1823(e) bar affirmative tort claims.
8 7
While acknowledging that the evidence could suggest that Common-
wealth expressed a certain belief regarding the venture's profitability, the
court concluded that such evidence did not amount to a valid written
agreement.8 8 Noting that § 1823(e) and D'Oench serve to promote cer-
tainty in bank records, the court found that "[s] cattered evidence in corpo-
rate records from which one could infer the existence of an agreement"
fails to promote certainty.8 9
4. Analysis
Unlike Oklahoma Radio Associates, which restrained D'Oench through a
strict construction of the doctrine, Castleglen reflects an expansion of both
D'Oench and § 1823(e). While Oklahoma Radio Associates indicates that
79. See id. at 1578.
80. Id. at 1577.
81. Id. at 1577-78.
[V]oid contracts are not "assets" at all and so do not fall under the scope of
§ 1823(e)'s prohibition against side agreements "which tend to diminish or defeat
the interest of the Corporation in any asset," while voidable contracts are true agree-
ments and as such invoke the full force of the statute.
Id. at 1577.
82. Id. at 1578.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1578-79 & 1578 n.4.
86. See id. at 1578.
87. Id.




D'Oench requires some proof of culpability, Castleglen counters that the
level of culpability need rise no further than allowing oneself to be fraudu-
lently induced into an agreement. This result is consistent with the
Supreme Court's decisions in D'Oench and Langley. An obligor "can be
very ignorant and ill-informed of the character of the transaction" 90 and
yet be precluded from using that ignorance to defeat the FDIC's or RTC's
claim. Where an obligor fails to comprehend the terms of an agreement
through no negligence on his part, however, neither an agreement nor an
asset exists for D'Oench to shield.
Oklahoma Radio Associates also indicates that where a bilateral agree-
ment may be shown to exist in a bank's records, a court cannot grant
summary judgment to the FDIC based on D'Oench estoppel. Castleglen cau-
tions that the written documents in a bank's files must unambiguously
show the agreement rather than merely infer one. These holdings are
consistent with the Langley and D'Oench purposes of ipholding the reliabil-
ity and certainty of financial institution records.
5. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit's decisions in Oklahoma Radio Associates and
Castleglen reflect the pro-regulatory bias inherent in both D'Oench and its
statutory counterpart. That bias appears most vividly when prohibiting af-
firmative tort claims under the legal fiction that they represent agreements
tending to deceive regulatory officials or to diminish assets in which either
the FDIC or RTC has an interest. Only that rare debtor who qualifies as
"wholly innocent" appears capable of eluding the D'Oench bar.
II. CORPORATE LAW
Despite the Supreme Court's broad proclamation in Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins9 t that "there is no federal general common law,"92 a growing
body of federal common law governs piercing the corporate veil ("PCV")
in areas of federal preeminence. 93 During the survey period, the Tenth
Circuit addressed piercing through the alter ego doctrine in a case involv-
ing federal labor law issues. NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing 4 adds to
the quantity of federal PCV precedent in the circuit but does not apprecia-
bly alter the state of the law.
90. Oklahoma Radio Assocs. v. FDIC, 987 F.2d 685, 693 (quoting D'Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1942)).
91. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
92. Id. at 78.
93. E.g., United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street Corp., 960 F.2d
1080 (1st Cir. 1992) (ERISA); NLRB. v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331 (6th
Cir. 1990) (federal labor dispute); Seymour v. Hull & Moreland Eng'g, 605 F.2d 1105 (9th
Cir. 1979) (suit to enforce labor contract under federal labor statute). See generally 1 WiLLIAM
M. FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.90 (perm.
ed. rev. vol. 1990) (discussing federal common law).
94. 2 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1993).
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A. Federal Common Law of Piercing the Corporate Veil and the Alter Ego
Doctrine: NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing
9 5
A corporation is a legal entity, separate from its shareholders.
96
Among other things, this separateness-a fundamental principle of Amer-
ican corporate law-permits the limitation of shareholder liability to the
amount of their investment in the corporation and consequently encour-
ages individual investment in enterprise where it would otherwise fail for
risk.9 7 When use of this corporate form is sufficiently improper, however,
the court may pierce the corporate veil to hold individual shareholders
personally liable for the corporation's obligations. 98 Federal common law
governs when a PCV issue arises in association with an area of federal pre-
eminence. 99 State law may be used for guidance but does not control the
outcome.
100
The alter ego doctrine provides one formulation for piercing the cor-
porate veil.10 1 The term alter ego generally signifies that a corporation is
merely an indistinguishable conduit for the shareholder's affairs. 10 2 Most
federal courts agree that the alter ego doctrine permits piercing where:
(1) there is such unity of ownership and interest among the shareholder
and the corporation that the corporation no longer has a separate exist-
ence 10 3 and (2) recognition of the corporation's separate existence would
sanction fraud or otherwise promote injustice. 10 4 Some circuits divide this
last element into two parts, requiring proof of both fraud and injustice.
10 5
95. Id.
96. 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 8 (1990); 1 FLETCHER, supra note 91, § 41.
97. Cathy S. Krendl &James R. Krendl, Piercing the Corporate Veil: Focusing the Inquiy, 55
DENY. U. L. REv. 1, 1-2 (1978).
98. 1 FLETCHER, supra note 93, § 41.
99. See NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 335 (6th Cir. 1990).
100. Id.
101. While it is uncertain whether the alter ego doctrine forms part of PCV law or exists
as an independent ground for holding a shareholder personally liable, numerous commenta-
tors and courts have considered the doctrine in the context of PCV law and this survey shall
follow the same convention. See, e.g., Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doc-
trine Under Federal Common Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 853 (1982).
102. Greater Kansas City, 2 F.3d 1047, 1052 (10th Cir. 1993); 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 12
(1990).
103. The rationale behind this element is that if the shareholder disregards the separate
identity of the corporation, the law likewise disregards the corporation's separateness to the
extent necessary to protect the corporation's creditors. Faithfulness to corporate formalities
"is the price paid for the corporate fiction, a relatively small price to pay for limited liability."
Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
104. See, e.g., Greater Kansas City, 2 F.3d at 1052; Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., 754
F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1985);John Mohr & Sons v. Apex Terminal Warehouses, Inc., 422 F.2d
638, 642 (7th Cir. 1970); see also I FLETCHER, supra note 91, § 41.10. One author attacks this
standard as a mere rehash of state law and suggests a particularized test for cases involving
federal law. Note, supra note 101, at 865-66.
105. United Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant Street, 960 F.2d 1080, 1093
(1st Cir. 1992); United Steel Workers v. Conners Steel Co., 855 F.2d 1499, 1507 (11th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1096 (1989).
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1. Tenth Circuit Decision: NLRB v. Greater Kansas City Roofing'0 6
The Greater Kansas City Roofing Company ("GKC") operated as a
sole proprietorship until November of 1985.107 Labor law violations and
financial difficulties contributed to the business' eventual demise. In
1983, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") found GKC guilty of
unfair labor practices and entered a monetary judgement of $133,742.47
against GKC.10 8 Adding to its predicament, GKC had borrowed a signifi-
cant amount from the proprietor's sister in law, Tina Clarke, to cope with
its monetary troubles.' 09
Convinced that GKC would fail, Tina Clarke accepted business assets
in lieu of foreclosure.'1 0 In October of 1985, she incorporated The New
Greater Kansas City Roofing Company ("New GKC") in order to continue
the business operations of GKC.111 At the time she formed New GKC,
Tina Clark did not know that GKC had committed unfair labor prac-
tices, 112 nor did she know that the NLRB had an outstanding judgment
against GKC. 113 GKC's unfair labor practices came to haunt Tina Clark
when New GKC substantially continued GKC's business and when she
failed to adhere to corporate formalities in operating New GKC. 114
In 1988, the NLRB General Counsel attempted to collect on the judg-
ment from New GKC and its sole shareholder, Tina Clarke. An adminis-
trative law judge (ALJ) found that New GKC, as the alter ego of its
predecessor, should assume GKC's obligations but refused to pierce New
GKC's veil to hold Tina Clarke personally liable. 115 The NLRB General
Counsel filed exceptions, and a three-member NLRB panel overturned
the ALJ's refusal to pierce New GKC's veil. 16 Declaring itself not "limited
to piercing the corporate veil only in cases where the corporate status is
used to perpetrate fraud," 1 7 the NLRB based its decision to pierce on
Tina Clark's intermingling of her affairs with those of New GKC t1 8 and
her failure to follow corporate formalities. 19
106. 2 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 1993).
107. Id. at 1049.
108. Id. at 1049 & n.3.






115. Id. The ALJ saw no justification for piercing New GKC's veil as he concluded that
Tina Clarke did not sufficiently intermingle her affairs with those of New GKC and did not
use New GKC's corporate form " 'to perpetrate fraud, evade existing obligations, or circum-
vent a statute.' " Id. (quoting the ALJ without citation).
116. Id. at 1051.
117. Id. (citing Supplemental Decision & Order, at 3).
118. For example, Tina Clarke paid the corporate payroll using personal funds, without
making a formal loan agreement, and received corporate funds in repayment of that infor-
mal loan. Id. at 1050. Moreover, she intermingled the business affairs of New GKC with her
escort service, Affaire d'Amiour. Id.
119. New GKC apparently had no bylaws, accounts, stock, or corporate records and held
no meetings. Id. The NLRB based its decision on its precedent in NLRB v. Concrete Mfg.
Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 727, 729 (1982). While that case cited intermingling of affairs to the point
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The case came before the Tenth Circuit on application for enforce-
ment of the NLRB order. 120 After noting that federal law governed the
issue, 12 1 the court overruled the NLRB decision.'
22
Piercing the veil under the alter ego doctrine required proof of two
elements. The first element considered was whether there existed "such
unity of interest and lack of respect given to the separate identity of the
corporation that the personalities and assets of the corporation by its
shareholders and the individual are indistinct."123 The second element
inquires if "adherence to the corporate fiction [would] sanction a fraud,
promote injustice, or lead to an evasion of legal obligations."124
After announcing the appropriate test, the court provided instruc-
tions for its application. The court broke the first element down into two
further considerations: (1) the degree to which shareholders have ob-
served corporate formalities and (2) the degree to which shareholders
have commingled their assets and affairs with those of the corporation. 125
Regarding the second prong, the court explained that the requisite
showing of inequity must "flow from the misuse of the corporate form.' 26
Moreover, the individual sought to be held personally liable "must have
shared in the moral culpability or injustice that is found to satisfy the sec-
ond prong of the test."'
27
Applying the test to the facts of the case, the court found the evidence
insufficient to establish the second element and on that basis alone re-
fused to enforce the NLRB order. 128 While Tina Clarke may have failed to
observe corporate formalities, her failure neither constituted fraud nor
created injustice. Since she formed New GKC long after the unfair labor
practices had occurred, the court found "no link between Tina Clarke's
sloppy manner of conducting business under New GKC and any fraud,
injury or injustice to the former employees of GKC... with regard to the
unfair labor practices that gave rise to this back-pay order."1 29
2. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Greater Kansas City does not depart
from precedent. As noted in the decision, prior Tenth Circuit decisions
of inseparableness as one instance in which the Board would disregard the corporate form, it
listed numerous other instances involving fraud or injustice as well. The case turned on the
defendants knowingly siphoning off corporate assets to avoid satisfying a back-pay judge-
ment. Id.
120. Greater Kansas City, 2 F.3d at 1049.
121. Id. at 1051 (citing NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 335 (6th
Cir. 1990)).
122. Id. at 1051.
123. Id. at 1052.
124. Id.
125. Id
126. Id. at 1053.
127. Id.
128. See i& at 1055 & n.4.
129. Id. at 1055.
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have utilized the two-part test for piercing the corporate veil under the
federal common law alter ego doctrine.
130
Greater Kansas City is notable for its emphasis of the test's second ele-
ment. In support of its two prong test, Greater Kansas City cites United States
v. VanDiviner13 1 and Milgro Electronics v. United Business Communications.
13 2
These decisions provide detailed tests for determining "separateness" and
make specific findings under those tests. 133 Neither decision, however,
provides a similar test for evaluating fraud, unfairness, or evasion of a legal
obligation.1 3 4 Moreover, while VanDiviner makes specific findings regard-
ing injustice,1 3 5 Milgro Electronics holds that proof of fraud is unnecessary
to establish injustice.
136
Thus, Greater Kansas City's reliance on the absence of fraud, injustice,
or evasion of a legal obligation in refusing to pierce1 3 7 emphasizes that
these elements must be present in a successful cause of action under the
federal common law alter ego doctrine. It also specifies the that the requi-
site showing under the second prong must prove a nexus between the
improper use of the corporate form, the resultant injustice, the party
sought to be charged, and the injured party.
CONCLUSION
Past commercial law Surveys have noted the Tenth Circuit's tendency
to broadly construe federal banking regulators' authority in order to en-
hance their ability to remedy the savings and loan debacle.13 8 While
Castleglen continues this tradition, Oklahoma Radio Associates may signal a
130. See, e.g., Anderson v. Deere & Co., 852 F.2d 1244, 1247 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. VanDiviner, 822 F.2d 960, 964 (10th Cir. 1987); Milgro Elec. Corp. v. United Busi-
ness Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 645, 659 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066
(1980).
131. 822 F.2d 960 (10th Cir. 1987).
132. 623 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980).
133. VanDiviner, which addresses the application of the alter ego doctrine to a closely
held corporation, provides an eight factor test for analyzing "separateness." VanDiviner, 822
F.2d at 965. These factors include:
(1) whether the corporation is operated as a separate entity; (2) commingling of
funds and other assets; (3)failure to maintain adequate corporate records or min-
utes; (4) the nature of the corporation's ownership and control; (5) absence of
corporate assets and undercapitalization; (6) use of a corporation as a mere shell,
instrumentality or conduit of an individual or another corporation; (7) disregard of
legal formalities and the failure to maintain an arms-length relationship among re-
lated entities; and (8) diversion of the corporation's funds or assets to non-corpo-
rate uses.
Id
Milgro Electronics provides a similar test for application to parent-subsidiary relationships.
Milgro, 623 F.2d at 660 (citing Fish v. East, 114 F.2d 177, 191 (10th Cir. 1940)).
134. VanDiviner, 822 F.2d at 964-65; Milgro Electronics, 623 F.2d at 658-62.
135. VanDiviner, 822 F.2d at 965. No evidence supported finding that the defendant "mis-
used or abused the corporate form in a way that would threaten injustice to the government."
Id.
136. See Milgro Electronics, 623 F.2d at 662.
137. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
138. Timothy K. Jordan, Survey, Commercial Law, 70 DENY. U. L. Rev. 685 (1993);
Michelle Rabouin & Anthony M. Leo, Survey, Corporate and Commercial Law, 69 DENy. U.
L. REv. 907 (1992).
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restrictive trend. The Tenth Circuit's willingness to limit the FDIC's and
RTC's enforcement powers, however, should not be overstated. Although
Oklahoma Radio Associates endorsed the complete innocence exception to
D'Oench estoppel, this exception applies to an extremely narrow category
of debtors.
In the area of corporate law, the Tenth Circuit examined piercing the
corporate veil under the alter ego doctrine. Greater Kansas City faithfully
adhered to established precedent. The decision's primary contribution
lies in its detailed instructions for applying the alter ego doctrine to PCV
issues.
Suzanne C. Pysher
